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Education 
PETER F. ORAZEM' 
introduction 
The World Bank's first effort to spur educational 
investments in children was in Tunisia in 1962. At 
that time, 41 percent of the world's children aged 
6-11 were not in school. 1 In SSA, only 25 per-
cent of primary-aged children were in school, while 
enrollment rates in the Arab States (39 percent) and 
South Asia (44 percent) were only modestly better. 
Their parents were not in a position to produce 
the education in the home - only one-third of the 
adult population in low-income countries were lit-
erate and the average adult education level was 1.6 
years. Even in middle-income countries, about 20 
percent of the primary-aged children were not in 
school, and one-third of their parents were illiter-
ate with an average education level of 2.8 years. 
Given the overwhelming evidence that literacy and 
schooling can improve health and economic out-
comes, the World Bank's focus was on expand-
ing the supply of available schools and qualified 
teachers. 
Over the next forty-nine years, the World Bank 
has invested $69 billion around the world to 
increase schooling outcomes in developing coun-
tries. Schooling outcomes have improved dramati-
cally in the developing world over that time. Only 
IO percent of primary-aged children are not in 
school. The enrollment rates in the Arab States 
(86 percent) and South Asia (91 percent) are more 
than double the rates in 1960. Of the primary-aged 
children out of school in these regions, just over 
half will never attend school while the rest have 
either dropped out after attending for at least some 
years or will enter eventually. Consequently, pri-
mary completion rates are approaching 90 percent 
or more in these areas, as they are in the world as a 
whole. 
Current children in low-income countries had 
the added benefit of more literate parents: now 61 
percent of adults in low-income countries can read 
and write. In middle-income countries, 83 per-
cent of parents are literate. As the children cur-
rently in school become adults, they will continue 
the process of making schooling investments self-
sustaining. The link between the education of par-
ents and their children is strong in every country, 
whether through the added income that school-
ing generates or through the added appreciation 
for schooling among literate adults. Consequently, 
the cost of inducing parents to send their chil-
dren to school declines as education becomes more 
widespread in the adult population. 
Nevertheless, progress on school enrollment is 
quite uneven. In SSA, 23 percent of primary-aged 
children are not in school. This is an improvement 
from 1960 to be sure, but still a disturbingly high 
level in a world where universal completion of pri-
mary schooling by 2015 is one of the UN MDGs. 
But even in SSA, the problem is not common across 
all countries. Over 30 percent of primary-aged chil-
dren are not in school in Equatorial Guinea ( 46 
percent); Cote d'Ivoire (43 percent); Niger (41 per-
cent); Nigeria (37 percent); Burkina Faso (36 per-
cent), and the Central African Republic (CAR) (31 
percent). 2 In South Asia, where progress toward 
schooling for all has been impressive in general, 
~ I thank Yiting Li and Claudio Montenegro for helping 
me locate critical data for the report, Beth King for pro-
viding background information, and Lant Pritchett, George 
Psacharopoulos, and the staff at Copenhagen Consens~ for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 These are UNESCO and UNICEF data compiled in 
Bellamy (1999). 
2 Data are from UNESCO (2011). 
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Pakistan still has 34 percent of its primary-aged 
children out of school. The source of these weak-
est educational outcomes in South Asia and SSA 
seems to reside outside the school system, however. 
All of these countries rank among the poorest gov-
erned according to the Fund for Peace Failed States 
index. 
The interactions between incentives to invest 
time in schooling and the economic and political 
climate in which the schools reside are critically 
important if we are to make progress on universal 
primary education. To capture a return on invest-
ments in schooling, individuals have to have the 
expectation that the government can insure them 
from the threat of expropriation of life, liberty, 
or property. And given that security, the rewards 
are greatest if the government provides sufficient 
mobility so that each individual can allocate their 
skills to the sector that offers the greatest reward. 
As shown in King et al. (20 I 2), the highest returns 
to schooling in the developing world are found in 
countries that score highest in economic freedom. 
It is in those countries that demand for school-
ing will be greatest and where progress toward 
schooling for all will be most easily made. Of 
course children can be compelled to attend school, 
but absent the freedom to use their skills, both 
the individual's and the country's returns will be 
small. 3 
This brief summary of the world's success in 
getting children into school suggests that the vast 
majority of children in even the poorest countries 
attend school and most now complete the primary 
cycle. Any effort to move children never in school 
to enroll will have to target children in failed states: 
the countries that now produce most of the excep-
tions to this general trend of rising enrollments. 
These are the countries that fail to provide many 
other public services besides education; that cannot 
provide their citizens the benefit of the rule of law; 
and whose governments are themselves ridden with 
corruption and criminality. Such countries are not 
good candidates for schooling investments. Ram-
pant corruption means that any international trans-
fer of funds directed to education in the country will 
likely be subject to large leakages to other purposes. 
Even if the funds go to their intended ends, parents 
will be unlikely to respond because there is little 
perceived return to human capital in countries that 
do not protect property rights, enforce contracts, 
or protect life. Even if the children go to school, 
the public and private returns will be lower because 
the child is less likely to have a long productive 
work life and because the skills learned in school 
will not be used for their most productive ends. 
Perhaps one could justify schooling investments in 
such countries on strictly moral grounds, but the 
investments cannot be justified using a cost-benefit 
criteria such as that underlying the Copenhagen 
Consensus. 
I should note that in his Alternative Perspec-
tive Paper on this topic (Chapter 5.2), George 
Psacharopoulos argues that we should not ignore 
the failed states on both expected returns and on 
equity grounds, and he makes a strong case in sup-
port of his view. While I am not persuaded that the 
returns are higher on that margin than the ones I 
propose, other readers will be, and so I encourage 
you to examine his case as well.4 
My assessment is that the more plausible returns 
come from schooling investments in developing 
countries whose market and political institutions 
instill confidence that schooling investments will 
be rewarded. Because these countries already have 
most of their children in school for at least some 
period of time, the investments' possibilities will 
3 An example is Cuba, where schooling rates and test scores 
are the highest in Latin America but the country remains 
much poorer than countries with lower levels of schooling 
but greater freedom to apply skills to their most productive 
ends. 
4 George Psacharopoulos reports that returns to schooling in 
twenty-one of the sixty countries designated as failed states 
have returns to schooling that are as large as returns in more 
functional countries. My concern is that estimated returns 
are lacking in thirty-nine of the sixty states. I suspect that 
estimated returns are lacking because it is not safe to con-
duct a survey, which is also why returns to human capi-
tal investments are likely to be low in these states. In the 
remaining twenty-one failed states, I suspect that the sur-
veys are confined to subregions where data is safe to collect. 
However, even if these estimates are accurate for children 
who receive schooling, one must ask why the other chil-
dren are not in school. My assessment is that it is not because 
schools are unavailable, but rather that factors associated with 
the failed state (insecurity, corruption, discrimination, ethnic 
conflict) are constraining enrollment. If so, enrollments will 
not increase until the government establishes legitimacy. 
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Figure 5.1 Marginal cost and benefit of schooling 
be either to increase the number of years of school-
ing or to increase learning p.a. of schooling. In the 
next section, we examine which of those options is 
more likely to capture a large return. 
Why school quality improvements are 
the dominant strategy in theory 
Our theoretical presentation is an adaptation of the 
framework developed by Bleakley (2010b). For a 
given country i in year t, the anticipated PV of 
devoting eit years of life to schooling is given 
by b(eif, qit, hit, lit)- The benefit is presumed to 
decline in years of schooling due to the dimin-
ishing marginal productivity of schooling. School 
quality, qit> and a health index, h;1, both raise 
the marginal benefit of schooling. Higher-quality 
schooling increases the marginal increment in skills 
from a year of schooling, skills that raise wages 
every year after leaving school. Better health raises 
the ability to learn while in school and raises the 
productivity of skills after leaving school.5 Finally, 
better economic institutions, l;r, that improve the 
Age at school 
leaving 
climate for applying skills to sectors freely with-
out fear of expropriation also raise the effi-
cient allocation of skills to tasks and hence raise 
returns to schooling.6 The presumed shape of the 
marginal schooling benefit relationship is shown in 
Figure 5. L 
The parents' discounted cost of investing in 
an additional year of schooling is given by 
c(eif, q11, h;r, Pit)- The primary source of these 
costs is the opportunity cost of time, which rises 
with years of schooling and past human capital 
accumulations. We would also expect that higher 
school quality raises past skill attainment for every 
year of schooling, and so the opportunity costs of 
5 See Bleakley (2010b) for a comprehensive review of the 
evidence supporting the role of improved health on earnings 
and education. 
6 Murphy et al. (1991, 1993) provide theoretical and empir-
ical arguments explaining why free and open economic insti-
tutions are conducive to growth. Acemoghr""'liand Johnson 
(2005) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) show how the protection 
of property rights and the rule of law benefit growth. Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2005) also argue that more democratic 
political institutions benefit growth. King et al. (2012) show 
that these same factors raise the returns to human capital. 
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Table 5.1 Change in the percentage of primary~aged children in school after fee elimination in SSA 
Country Year fees ehmmated Ofr, enrc\\ed before ehmmat10r. (year) 0/u enrc\\ed 2009 ()/o change m enrollme~~te 
Cameroon 2000 69.5 (1991) 91.6 31.8 
Ethiopia 1994 20.3 (1994) 82.7 307.4 
Ghana 2005 59.5 (1999) 75.9 27.6 
Kenya 2003 62.4 (1999) 82.1 31.6 
Lesotho 2000 57.3 (1999) 73.l 27.6 
Mozambique 2004-2006 52.4 (1999) 90.6 72.9 
Tanzania 2001 49.3 (1999) 96.4 95.5 
Zambia 2002 69.3 (1999) 90.7 30.9 
Malawi 1994 90.8 49' 
Uganda 1997 92.2 68" 
Other SSA Reference 62 (1999) 77 24 
Note:" Estimated by Kattan (2006) from changes in gross primary enrollment rates. 
Sources: Kattan (2006); World Bank (2009); Author's computation of World Development Indicators. 
schooling also rise in qit· Greater health makes any-
one more productive in the labor market, and so 
opportunity costs also rise in hu. The direct costs 
of schooling are given by Pit, which includes the 
distance to school and the fees or material costs 
charged to parents. The presumed shape of the 
marginal cost of schooling is also demonstrated in 
Figure 5.1. Parents evaluate the benefits and costs 
of the schooling opportunities afforded their chil-
dren and decide to keep their children in school 
through age e*. 
There are several mechanis1ns that the gov-
ernment has at its disposal to influence parental 
schooling investment. These include building more 
schools, eliminating school fees, improving school 
quality, improving the provision of government 
services that completnent schooling such as pub-
lic health, or improving economic institutions 
to enhance the 1narket return on human capital 
investments. The relative returns to these policies 
depends on the country's current level of schooling 
investment and the fraction of children already in 
school. 
When a country has a large share of its chil-
dren out of school, so that schooling costs exceed 
the benefits at an positive values of e, policies that 
shift the cost function downward are most effec-
tive. These would include building more schools 
to lower the travel costs of attendance or lowering 
fees. This could also involve tying school atten-
dance to transfers to the household, whether in kind 
(meals or health services provided at the school) 
or in cash transfers. Programs that shift schooling 
investments from 0 to so1ne positive level will cap-
ture returns equal to the area under the marginal 
benefit curve in Figure 5.1. Because the highest 
marginal benefits are at the lowest levels of school-
ing, such strategies can capture substantial returns. 
However, these policies will have much smaller 
returns if a substantial portion of the school-aged 
population is already in school. 
It is apparent that households can be quite sensi-
tive to changes in schooling fees. Several African 
countries have eliminated fees over the past fifteen 
years. The increase in the proportion of primary-
aged children attending school is often dramatic, as 
shown in Table 5.1. Countries that have eliminated 
fees have experienced much larger increases in 
school enrollment than their neighboring countries 
that continued to charge fees. Furthermore, several 
studies have shown that the dramatic increase in 
school enrollments has not seriously eroded school 
quality and may even be accotnpanied by improve-
ments in test scores. 7 Nevertheless, these policies 
are only cost-effective when a large number of 
7 See the reviews by Kattan (2006) and the World Bank 
(2009). 
are withholding children from school 
beocatise of the fees. As indicated on p. 274, the 
remaining countries with substantial proportions of 
children being withheld from school tend to be ones 
with poor prospects for a return to investments in 
schooling. 
Consequently, our better strategy is to focus on 
policies that will raise returns in countries that 
already have their children in school. In such coun-
tries, a policy that moves average years of schooling 
from e* toe**, as in Figure 5.1, will have only a 
modest return. Instead, policies should focus on 
shifting the entire schedule of marginal benefits 
upward through improved economic institutions, 
improving child health, or providing higher-quality 
schools. 
The least expensive of these options is to 
improve the climate for econo1nic freedom. King 
et al. (2012) showed that countries with low costs 
of establishing a business, strong protection for 
property rights, and a low tax burden for sup-
porting the government had significantly higher 
returns to schooling than did similar countries with 
more restrictive economic climates. The improved 
marginal benefit from these institutions are sub-
stantial. An additional year of schooling increased 
annual income by 9.7 percent in developing coun-
tries in the upper quartile of the Heritage Founda-
tion's Economic Freedom Index, but only 6.3 per-
cent for developing countries in the bottom quartile. 
In other words, a country can increase the returns 
to schooling by a third by making it easier for their 
population to pursue entrepreneurial ventures and 
by insuring that the gains to success will not be 
expropriated by the government or by criminals. 
While the cost of these reforms is low in one sense, 
it often requires a complete reorientation of the 
economy and the government to a market system. 
The experience of the transition to market in the 
former Soviet states suggests that the cost of the 
conversion can be substantial, even if the benefits 
once the transition is cotnpleted are also substantial. 
The theoretical effect of improvements in school 
quality are similar to the theoretical effect<; of 
improved health - both will shift up the marginal 
benefit curve and both will increase the cost of 
additional schooling because of added opportunity 
costs. In Figure 5.1 we demonstrate the theoretical 
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effects of an improvement in school quality from a 
level qu to a level qft· Notice first that because both 
marginal benefits and marginal costs rise, the effect 
of improved school quality on years of schooling is 
ambiguous. Children may actually spend less time 
in school when school quality improves, although 
in our example, we let years of schooling rise mod-
estly as a particular example.8 What is unambigu-
ous is that the PV of any given year of additional 
schooling rises with school quality. 
Not shown in Figure 5.1 is that an improve-
ment in health from a level hit to h;1 will shift the 
marginal benefit and marginal costs curves in the 
same direction as an improvement in school quality. 
Improved health will raise the PV of schooling in 
any given year, but it may cause years of schooling 
to decrease. 
The other important implication is that the gains 
from an increase in qit or hit come mainly from 
their effect on increased productivity of schooling 
for years 0 through e", and not from any induced 
change in years of schooling. As school quality 
rises from qu to q;f' or as health rises from hi1 to 
h;t, the value of the induced increase in schooling 
productivity is the change in the area under the 
two marginal benefit curves as the school leaving 
age increases from 0 to e*. The gain attributable 
to the induced increase in years of schooling is 
the area below b(eit• q;1 , hit, lit) between e* and 
e**. Of course, it is possible that the age of school 
leaving actually declines as school quality or health 
improve, which implies that all of the gain from 
improved school quality or health comes from the 
increased efficiency of producing human capital per 
year of schooling. 
This chapter is supposed to evaluate alternative 
development strategies for the education sector. 
Now that the vast majority of children in devel-
oping countries are in school or else in a country 
where education investments hold little value, the 
best option is to try to bump up the marginal benefit 
per year of schooling in countries where children 
are already in school rather than to add additional 
years of schooling. As this section$demonstrates, 
8 Cross-counhy analysis by Castel\6-Climent and Hidalgo-
Cabrillana (2012) is consistent with modest increases in 
attendance as school quality improves. 
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investments in health behave much like invest-
ments in school quality. Therefore, it is useful to 
compare the case for improving school quality 
versus an alternative use of the funds: to invest 
in child health. If education investments are to 
meet the Copenhagen Consensus cost-benefit bar, 
they must hold greater promise than investments 
in health, an issue we will address in the last 
section. 
The World Bank's education strategy, Learning 
for All (World Bank, 2011) also focuses on school 
quality as the prefe1Ted mechanism to stitnulate 
human capital development in LDCs. The World 
Bank's rationale for focusing on learning rather 
than years in school is quite different from the 
theoretical argument presented on pp. 275-7. The 
World Bank's strategy is predicated on the percep-
tion that many schools in developing countries are 
of poor quality. As evidence, the report cites find-
ings that school achievement in developing coun-
tries lags that in developed countries for similar 
years of schooling and that children often com-
plete the primary cycle unable to read and write. 
Indeed, studies show that cognitive attainment is 
more highly correlated with economic growth and 
per capita income than is years in school. But that 
finding is hardly surprising when we consider the 
implications of Figure 5.1. Cross-country variation 
in years of schooling has to explain less of the vari-
ation in per capita incomes than would direct mea-
sures of schooling outcomes such as test scores: 
Better schools and better complementary inputs 
such as health do not necessarily raise years in 
school but they do raise schooling outcomes. How-
ever, we do not know how much of the higher test 
scores in developed countries are attributable to bet-
ter schools and how much to better complementary 
inputs such as better child health. 
Focusing on school quality makes sense because 
the returns from expanding access to schools have 
been exhausted and not because the schools in 
developing countries are poor. The schools have 
always been poor, but they were better than no 
schools. We should now focus on the quality 
of schooling offered to those already in school, 
because the return from getting the last 5 percent 
of children never attending school to enter a school 
is outweighed by the cost. 
There are several options that have been pro~ 
posed to improve school quality in developing 
countries. The three that I will review in detail 
here include etforts to improve school management 
through decentralizing decision-making or increas~ 
ing parental involvement; increasing the quality 
of teacher-student interactions through incentive 
programs or greater accountability that increase 
teacher effort; and efforts to increase the quality 
of child effort in school. These three strategies will 
be evaluated with respect to the quality of our cur~ 
rent knowledge of their effectiveness, their costs 
of implementation, and how easily strategies that 
prove effective in a local area can be generalized 
to the country level or to other countries. I will 
then compare the potential benefits of these three 
options to a like-sized investment in child health. 
Do investments in child health 
contribute to economic growth? 
Maddison (2001) developed series of world pop-
ulations and output that spanned 2,000 years. His 
data provide a useful perspective froin which to 
judge the role of health and nutrition on growth. 
At the time of the first Roman Census, there were 
231 million world inhabitants. By the cusp of the 
Industrial Revolution in 1700, the world population 
was 603 million - a net increase of 0.06 percent per 
year. Labor productivity grew at an even slower 
pace of 0.02 percent per year, so that a worker in 
1700 was only 1.4 times more productive than a 
worker in year 0. 
In the subsequent 300 years, the world popula-
tion increased tenfold, a rate of 0. 8 percent per year. 
Even so, the average person was becoming better 
off because labor productivity was also rising at 
0.8 percent per year. As a result, living conditions 
improved rapidly along almost any metric. Life 
expectancy in England stood at thirty-two years 
at the start of the industrial revolution, and rose to 
forty-eight by 1900. Similar gains occurred else-
where in Europe (Fogel, 2004). 
One key factor was rising scientific knowledge, 
that led to improved sanitary and health conditions 
for peoples living in close proximity to one another, 
and a rising literacy base that enabled individuals to 
Jearn about how to avoid disease. But none of that 
would have been possible, as persuasively argued 
by Fogel (2004 ), without the dramatic improvement 
in agricultural technology that led to a rising nutri-
tional status of the average citizen, the freeing up of 
rural labor for industry, and the rising purchasing 
power of urban wages due to cheaper food. The role 
of the agricultural revolution in setting the stage for 
rising living standards is so important that Huff-
man and Orazem (2007) could point to only two 
cases - Hong Kong and Singapore - where growth 
bad occurred without a dramatic increase in agri-
cultural yields. In those two cases, the city states 
were able lo trade their way into the agricultural 
revolutions occurring elsewhere. 
Before 1700, the Malthusian prediction that the 
population expanded to consume any available 
increases in food production was essentially cor-
rect, as evidenced by the absence of apprecia-
ble growth in per capita output. During those 
1,700 stagnant years, per capita food produc-
tion was too low to energize the labor force for 
hard work. Fogel (2004) estimated that at least 
2,000 calories per person would be necessary to 
support a full day of productive work. In the late 
1700s, about 40 percent of the French males and 
20 percent of the British males did not attain this 
minimal level of nutrition, meaning that they were 
too undernourished to perform a full day of work. 
Because the location of crop failures and food short-
ages varied from year to year, even those who 
attained the minimal level of nutrition on aver-
age were so stunted that they were at substantially 
higher risk of incurring chronic health conditions 
and of premature mortality. Only after the improve-
ments in fertilizers, animal husbandry, plant and 
animal breeding, transportation, storage, and sani-
tation were the populations of Europe sufficiently 
nourished to do the work of the Industrial Revolu-
tion. Only with the resulting rise in life expectancy 
did the average citizen have an incentive to acquire 
added skills, including literacy and numeracy. Only 
then was there a critical ma<>s of educated citizenry 
necessary to spur the technological revolutions that 
followed. 
Applying Pritchett's (1997) estimate of the 
minimum income necessary to attain nutritional 
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subsistence to Maddison's (2001) estimates of GDP 
per capita, we know that most of the world's pop-
ulation in 1700 was too malnourished to perform 
significant work. In much of SSA, diets today are 
comparable to the diets available to the OECD 
countries at the start of the Industrial Revolution. It 
is doubtful that we will see dramatic growth in per 
capita incomes in Africa without the same attain-
ment of nutritional adequacy that has pre-dated the 
industrial revolutions on all the other populated 
continents. 
UNICEF compilations indicale that 28 per-
cent of children in developing countries are 
moderately or severely undernourished. In areas 
where malnutrition is common, nutritional supple-
ments and/or treatments for intestinal diseases or 
parasites otl'er an inexpensive way to raise school 
attendance and physical and mental capacity. The 
earliest efforts to use nutrition as a development 
tool date back to the 1969 intervention designed by 
the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and 
Panama (INCAP) in Guatemala. Researchers pro-
vided food supplements to pregnant women and 
young children in four villages. Two villages were 
given a high-protein, high-energy drink and two 
were provided a no-protein, low-energy drink. Both 
supplements contained vitamins and minerals. For 
seven years, information was collected on physi-
cal growth, mental development, school attendance, 
and morbidity along with information on nutri-
ent intake and on characteristics of the family.9 
Because the assessment reflects a comparison of 
two nutritional supplements that differ only in pro-
tein, the effects understate the benefits of more gen-
eral improved nutrition that would include vitamins 
and tninerals. Nevertheless, the effects were quite 
impressive. Taking the more complete dietary sup-
plement led to increased birthweights, lower infant 
mortality, and faster physical growth through the 
first three years. Thereafter, both groups of children 
grew at rates comparable to those of well-nourished 
children. 
9 Summaries of the study design and findings can be found 
in Martorell (1995) and Martorell et al. (1995). Behrman 
(2009) provides a comprehensive review of the short- and 
long-term studies from an economic perspective. 
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However, the more itnpressive results came from 
a follow-up survey of the children when they 
reached 25-42 years of age. Both boys and girls 
who received the high protein-high energy drink 
demonstrated better cognitive abilities. The males 
were able to engage in more physical labor and 
they earned a third more than comparable males in 
the control villages. The young women who took 
the more nutritious drink were taller and had lower 
body fat. The boys did not attend school longer, 
but they learned more. The girls attended school 
1.4 years longer, and learned more. While there are 
weaknesses in the study's design that might give 
us pause, the weight of the evidence that improving 
nutrition improves human capital outcomes is quite 
impressive. 
A key advantage of these nutritional supple-
ment interventions is their modest cost. Damon and 
Glewwe (2009) estimated that the program cost 
$23.25 per year per child including a $5 annual 
cost for medical care. There are additional effi-
ciencies from distributing these supplements at 
school which limits costs of transportation and stor-
age. One could even consider making the supple-
ment conditional on child attendance, although that 
seems unnecessary. Parents who value the supple-
ment may end up sending their children to school 
longer even if attendance is not required, as was 
true in the INCAP case for girls. Furthermore, if 
the treatment is not for nutrition but for disease 
prevention or eradication, as with vaccinations or 
treatments for intestinal worms, broader distribu-
tion increases the effectiveness of the treatment by 
lowering the number of children in the area who are 
at risk for contracting and spreading the disease. 
Improved health increases the efficiency of child 
time in school through several avenues. Properly 
nourished children can better concentrate on school 
work. Moreover, brain development is adversely 
affected by nutrient deficiencies so that supple-
ments of micronutrients such as iodine, zinc or 
iron or additional calo1ies available from school 
meals can improve cognitive ability (Zimmerman 
et al., 2006; Horton et al., 2009). As shown in the 
INCAP study, these nutrient advantages even pass 
fro1n mother to child, as children undernourished 
in utero are also disadvantaged in cognitive devel-
opment (Doblhammer et al., 2011; Zimmerman, 
2009) and infant health. Finally, if the ""'fleni,' 
are made available at the school, there is an 
tional reason for the parents to send their 
to school. 
Just as there is evidence that improving Huu:u100 
can have lifetime benefits, there is also wioenre 
that malnutrition during a child's formative 
compromises both cognitive and physical 
opment later in life. Glewwe et al. (2001) 
that, controlling for other household ba,ck!~mund 
measures, children who were malnourished 
in life start school later, complete fewer years 
schooling, and learn less per year of schooling. 
a series of studies examining the role of 
conflicts on child welfare, Richard Akresh and 
colleagues 10 demonstrated that crop failures 
disruptions in food supply consistently led to 
ing of young children and to decreased co1mplet1'd 
years of schooling which would permanently 
lifetime earnings. 
There are strong theoretical reasons why 
ventions aimed at raising human capital accournu-
lations should occur earJy in life. Examination of 
Figure 5.1 shows that an early intervention with per-
sistent effects can raise the marginal benefit curve 
at every stage of life, but waiting limits the bene-
fits to whatever length of life is left. James Heck-
man and his colleagues have argued in a series of 
studies that it is the earliest interventions in school-
ing that are the least costly and most effective. 11 
Indeed, there is ample evidence that early nutrition 
interventions are successful and can have favorable 
lifetime impacts in both developed and develop-
ing countries. In the United States, Bhattacharya 
et al. (2006) found that recipients of school break-
fast programs built better eating habits by reducing 
the percentage of calories from fat and increasing 
fiber intake. Recipients also had fewer deficien-
cies in vitamin C, vitamin E, folate, potassium, and 
iron, all of which have important implications for 
improved health or cognitive development. 
In Bolivia, Behrman et al. (2004) conducted an 
experimental evaluation of the Proyecto Integral 
10 See Akresh and de Wa\que (2011), and Bundervoet et al. 
(2009, 2011). 
1 I See Heckman and Masterov (2009) for a review of this 
literature. 
pesarrollo lnfantil (PIDI) program in Bolivia. 
program provides daycare, nutritional inputs, 
d pre-school activities for low-income children 
an ed 6-72 months. For children exposed to the 
a;0 gram for periods exceeding 1 year, the authors ~eport permanent ~ains in cognitive development 
and fine motor skills. Grantham-McGregor et al. 
(1991) report comparabl~ finding.s i'Or a si.milar pro-
gram aimed at stunte~ infant~ in Jamaica, as do 
Arroecin et al. (2006) tor low-income rural house-
holds in the Philippines. 
Nevertheless, nutritional interventions can still 
be cost-effective later in life, even if they would 
have been even more effective had they been 
iIIlplemented earlier. The benefits are not confined 
to early childhood interventions. McGuire (1996) 
reports that giving iron supplements to secondary 
school age children (13-15 years) in a low-income 
country can raise cognitive abilities by 5-25 per-
cent or the equivalent of 0.5 years of schooling. 
These nutrients can even improve cognitive abil-
ities in adults, as was demonstrated by Brown 
et al. (2006), who found that Indian textile workers 
became more productive after being given inexpen-
sive iron supplements and treatments for intestinal 
parasites. 
Parasitic infestations can rob a child of necessary 
nutrients even when the child has enough food. 
Worm infestations cause symptoms ranging from 
chronic fatigue and weakness to protein malnutri-
tion, abdominal pains, and anemia. Malaria is a 
parasitic invasion of the bloodstream that can result 
in recurring bouts of chills, sweats, nausea, aches, 
and fatigue in the milder cases to seizures, kid-
ney and liver disease, and death in the more severe 
cases. Numerous studies have shown that children 
exposed to intestinal worms or malaria miss signif-
icantly more days of school (Miguel and Kremer, 
2004; Bobonis et al., 2006; Bleakley, 20!0a). 
Protection from the worms is amazingly inex-
pensive. A 20 cent pill provides protection for four 
months with 99 percent efficacy, meaning that less 
than $1 a year can protect 99 percent of the chil-
dren from the disease. Because the disease is spread 
by fecal contamination of water or soil by infected 
people, as the number of infected people decreases 
the probability of infection falls even for people 
who are not treated. Therefore there is a significant 
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external benefit to untreated people from treating a 
subset of the population. 
Miguel and Kremer (2004) examined the effects 
of an intervention in which a subset of schools 
received treatments and a second set of schools 
were excluded. The cost of the program, includ-
ing the pills along with the cost.;; of distribution 
and administration, came to $3.50 per student. 
As expected, infection rates were cut in half in 
treated schools. However, student absenteeism in 
treated schools fell 25 percent. Follow-up surveys 
of the children who were exposed to the program 
early on worked 13 percent more hours and earned 
20-29 percent more than did the children in the 
control schools who were not exposed to treat-
ment until two-three years later (Karlan and Appel, 
2011). 
Babonis et al. (2006) repeated the interven-
tion for a sample of pre-school students in Delhi. 
Treated children received deworrning medicine 
along with iron and vitamin A supplements. Atten-
dance increased 20 percent. 
By now, we can have a high confidence that 
nutritional supplements and treatments for para-
sites can make children healthier and increa'!e the 
productivity of the time spent in school, at least 
in experimental settings. We also have strong evi-
dence that protracted interventions on a broader 
scale have significant positive effects on student 
time in school, learning, and lifetime earnings. 
Bleakley (2007) studied the impacts on health, edu-
cation, and income from a large-scale hookworm 
eradication program that was initiated in the South-
ern United States in 1910. Infection rates were 
30-40 percent. Children who grew up in the areas 
where the eradication campaign was focused most 
intensively increased school attendance and literacy 
attainment significantly. The estimated impacts on 
adult income suggest that going from an area with 
100 percent probability of infection to 0 raises adult 
income by 4 3 percent. 
Bleakley (2010a) performed a similar analysis 
of the effects of growing up in an area that expe-
rienced malaria eradication in Brazil, C<'Slombia, 
Mexico, and the United States. Children growing 
up in areas with successful eradication were much 
more likely to attain literacy and had significantly 
higher incomes later in life: from 12 percent higher 
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in the United States to 40 percent higher in Latin 
America. 
In short, there is substantial evidence from small-
scale experiments to large-scale parasitic eradi-
cation and nutrition programs that children can 
gain lifetime benefits from improvements in their 
nutritional health. These interventions are fre-
quently of modest cost compared to other pro-
grams aimed at raising human capital development. 
They also have substantial external benefits in that 
even untreated recipients can benefit, whether in 
utero children are born healthier when their mother 
receives nutrient supplements or untreated chil-
dren face lower risk of infection because their 
friends are receiving deworming medicine. It is 
against this backdrop that other programs aimed at 
i1nproving schooling outcomes must be judged for 
cost-effectiveness. For children who start school 
malnourished, stunted, and deprived of nutrients 
necessary for proper cognitive development, no 
improvement in school quality will improve the 
child's lifetime prospects more than addressing the 
malnutrition at an early age. 
Do school investments contribute to 
economic growth? 
Yearsof schooling 
Before embarking on strategies expending public 
funds for schooling, we have to establish whether 
such investments contribute to the public good. 
Human capital has played a prominent role in 
explanations of economic growth since the time 
of Adam Smith (Smith, 1776), who pointed to the 
ability to specialize according to skill as the source 
of increasing labor productivity. Schultz (1975) 
emphasized the ability to combine managerial skills 
with other inputs as a source of increasing returns 
to scale that is essential to economic growth. Lucas 
(2002) saw spillover benefits from placing educated 
peoples in the presence of other educated peoples. 
All of these ideas suggest that investments in educa-
tion make the individual more productive but make 
other workers and other factor inputs more produc-
tive as well. 
Given the prominence of human capital in the-
oretical explanations of economic growth, the 
empirical evidence supporting the existence 
spillover benefits from private educational 
ments is decidedly mixed. Punctuating that 
are three reviews of social returns to schooling 
developing countries, all basing their c011cl1usiiJno 
using a different approach to comparable 
country data sets and all using the level 
output per worker as the dependent variable. 
nos and Psacharopoulos (2011) tolmd Jar·gepo:sitive 
spillover benefits that were much larger than 
vate returns to schooling. Lange and Topel 
concluded that social returns were no smaller 
private returns, but were not much larger. 
ett (2006) concluded that there was no evidence 
spillover benefits. 12 
It is tempting to dismiss these maLCnJec:on1on1et-
ric studies of the role of educational attainment 
on the productive capacity of an economy, given 
the lack of agreement on how to properly specify 
empirical formulations of economic growth. 
Durlauf et al. (2005) reported that across over 
400 studies, 145 different variables had been shown 
to explain the cross-country pattern of growth in at 
least one analysis. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that schooling has been shown by some to be criti-
cal to economic growth while others conclude that 
it lacks any social benefit beyond the private return 
earned by those receiving the schooling. Neverthe-
less, this research has played a significant role in the 
debate on public support for schooling, including 
in 2004 and 2008 Copenhagen Consensus Chal-
lenge Papers, and so I provide my assessment of 
this research. 
One reason for the lack of consensus on the 
magnitude of social returns to schooling invest-
ments is that the presence of these spillover benefits 
depends critically on the ability for individuals to 
apply their human capital to productive ends. Coun-
tries that protect property rights and allow individ-
uals to apply their skills to their highest rewards 
12 Cohen and Soto (2007), Barro and Lee (2010) and Breton 
(2012) present evidence that when additional data, alternate 
measures of education, or alternative specifications are used, 
macroeconometric estimates of the effect of schooling on 
output per worker are similar to the returns to schooling esti-
mated from microeconometric Mincerian earnings functions. 
However, they are not larger than the private returns, as would 
be required if education had substantial external benefits. 
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fable s.2A Random effects estimation of the effect of changes in level and average schooling on ten-year labor 
productivity growth 
Exogenous Variable 1 2 3 
::Sri 
-'$it J1eritage 
Sit Polity 
Cr1 
J(i1-tHeritage 
J(il*Polity 
(Sit -Sit-to) 
(Sj,it - Si(it- lO))*Heritage 
[(S]{I -Sit-10) *Polity 
Trend 
Constant 
-&-squared 
No res: 
t-statistics in parentheses. 
0.023" (2.35) 
-0.032" (2.46) 
- 0.0025** (2.3) 
5.22** (2.47) 
0.022 
309 
- 0.134" (2.41) 
0.0025" (2.48) 
0.0027 (0.79) 
0.183" (l.95) 
- 0.0029' (l.75) 
-0.0136** (2.24) 
- 0.0027 (1.30) 
4.23' (l.86) 
0.056 
309 
- 0.132" (2.37) 
0.0024** (2.41) 
0.0028 (0.81) 
0.24** (2.34) 
-0.004** (2.11) 
- 0.014** (2.32) 
- 0.263 (l.37) 
0.004 (l.\5) 
0.008 (0.69) 
- 0.0024" (2.14) 
3.42 (l.42) 
0.064 
309 
Dependent variable: [ln{y;,) - ln(Yir-·lO)J, where Yu is GDP per worker in country i in year t. 
S11 : average years of schooling for the population aged 25 and over in country i in year t. 
K1r: capital per worker in constant 2005 dollars in country i and year t. 
Heritage; Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, with higher values being freer in the base year t. 
PoHty: Freedom House Imputed Polity Index, with higher values being more Democratic in the base year t. 
Regressions also included uninteracted Heritage and Polity effects which were significant and positive in all regressions. 
will encourage the types of productive contract-
ing that Schultz (1975) and Lucas (2002) argued 
would generate spillover benefits. Schultz (1975) 
went further, to explain that managerial skills are 
most productive in the face of rapidly changing 
technologies and market conditions, but that human 
capital has little value in econo1nies where tradi-
tional technologies are used. On the other hand, 
corrupt political institutions encourage unproduc-
tive applications of skills where the most able try 
to extract resources from their neighbors (Mur-
phy et al., 1991, 1993). Studies that fail to control 
for the economic environment in which the educa-
tional investments occur will have trouble identify-
ing spillovers. 
We can illustrate the importance of economic 
and political institutions by replicating the spe-
cifications used by Lange and Topel (2006) and 
Pritchett (2006) with a dataset composed solely of 
developing countries over the period 1960-2010. 
The growth in GDP per worker is regressed on 
initial levels and changes in average years of 
schooling, holding fixed capital per worker and a 
trend measure. The results are shown in Table 5.2A. 
Column (1) shows that starting a decade with an 
additional year of average schooling leads to 2.3 
percent faster productivity growth over the next ten 
years. While the effect is statistically significant, 
it is quite small in magnitude and does not suggest 
large external benefits from schooling, consistent 
with the Topel-Lange and Pritchett conclusions. 
Column (2) adds interaction terms with measures of 
economic and political freedom. Column (3) adds 
terms in the change in years of schooling over the 
decade as well as the start-of-period level of school-
ing. The change in years of schooling does not add 
significantly to our ability to explain labor pro-
ductivity growth, so we will focus on the results in 
column (2). 
The level effect of years of schoolifig on growth 
turns out to be negative - implying literally that a 
country that has no democracy and no economic 
freedom loses 13.4 percent ofit'i productivity over 
ten years per year of schooling. Counteracting that 
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Table 5.28 Implied impact of schooling level and economic and political freedom on ten-year growth in labor 
productivity 
Schooling quartile (average years of schooling in year t) ~ 
Freedom quartile 25 %1le (1 9 years) Median (3 6 years) 75 %1le (6 1 yearsij 
25 %ile 
Median 
75 %ile 
0.004 
D.03 
0.068 
effect is the finding that as the country moves up 
the distribution of economic and political freedom, 
the returns to schooling in the form of productivity 
growth turn positive. While the coefficient on the 
interaction between Polity and years of schooling is 
not significant, the joint effect of schooling includ-
ing the interactions with Polity and Heritage were 
significant. 
In Table 5.28, we simulate the effect of rising 
schooling and rising economic and political free-
dom on labor productivity growth. At the lowest 
freedom quartile, being in the upper quartile of 
years of schooling only raises ten-year productivity 
growth by 1.2 percent. In contrast, the same level 
of schooling in a country at the upper quartile of 
economic and political freedom will experience 22 
percent labor productivity growth over the next ten 
years. In effect, if a country wishes to reap a reward 
from its schooling investments, it needs to provide 
its citizens sufficient freedom to apply their human 
capital. King et al. (2012) found corroborating evi-
dence that it is the freest societies that have the 
highest returns to schooling. 
There is also more consistent corroborating evi-
dence of the existence of educational spillovers in 
microeconomic datasets. Moretti (2004a, 2004b) 
showed that workers and firms gain productivity 
when they are in markets with greater concentra-
tions of educated workers. Nor are the benefits con-
fined to economic returns. Lochner and Moretti 
(2004) showed that education lowers incidence 
of critne. Currie and Moretti (2003) showed that 
higher maternal education increases infant health 
and lowers the probability that the child will have 
only one parent or will be exposed to second-hand 
smoke. Grossman (2006) provides a comprehen-
sive review of studies that demonstrate that higher 
levels of education lower population growth, raise 
0.007 
0.058 
0.130 
0.012 
0.098 
0.220 
child health and education, and improve individual 
health as an adult. These benefits provide additional 
social returns beyond the estimated improvements 
in labor productivity above any private gain. 
Two further studies provide a historical con-
text that further demonstrates why education still 
remains a compelling strategy for economic devel-
opment. Becker and Woessmann (2009) show that 
the spread of the Protestant Reformation and its 
emphasis on reading scripture led to a more liter-
ate work force. Counties closer to Wittenberg, the 
home of Martin Luther, experienced more rapid 
income growth and a more rapid path to industri-
alization. Given the improvements in employment 
opportunities for low-skilled labor and gains in life 
expectancy and nutritional status associated with 
the industrial revolution (Fogel, 2004), it seems 
apparent that the gains in average literacy bene-
fitted not only those who acquired literacy but the 
population as a whole. 
Aaronson and Mazu1nder (2011) evaluated the 
impact of a philanthropic effort to add school-
ing options and improve school quality for black 
children in the American South. The Rosenwald 
Rural School Building Program to educate South-
ern black children added almost 5,000 schools 
between J 913 and 1931. Because the program was 
not evenly distributed throughout the South, we 
can assess how exposure affected years of school-
ing, cognitive attainment, and geographic mobil-
ity of these children when they reached adulthood. 
Children exposed to the program had significantly 
improved human capital and mobility outcomes 
compared to those who did not grow up in close 
proximity to a Rosenwald school. The estimated 
rate of return in the form of enhanced earnings 
potential of recipients relative to the cost of the 
schooling investment was between 7-9 percent, 
well in excess of returns to bonds at the time. That 
the program served a social desire to equalize eco-
nomic opportunity for a population that was inef-
ficiently excluded from the opportunity to acquire 
human capital means that there was an additional 
social return beyond the private return going to the 
recipients. 
My assessment of the most recent macroecono-
rnetric evidence supports the view that increased 
years of schooling can yield significant social 
returns, but only if the country has economic and 
political institutions that complement schooling. 
That still leaves open the issue of how one can 
increase schooling investments most efficiently. 
School quality 
A second series of papers has argued that it is 
school quality and not years of schooling that mat-
ters for economic growth. The empirical evidence 
advanced to support this conclusion involves find-
ings that direct measures of human capital out-
perform years of schooling in explaining various 
measures of labor productivity. Microeconomet-
ric studies that have information on both years 
of schooling and measures of cognitive attainment 
typically find that it is the latter that raises earnings 
(Glewwe, 2002). A similar result holds in studies of 
economic growth. When both measures of average 
years of schooling and average cognitive attain-
ment are included as variables explaining growth 
in output per capita, it is the cognitive attainment 
that more strongly affects growth (Hanushek and 
Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessman, 2008)n 
These studies treat higher average cognitive attain-
ment as indicative of better school quality. 14 
While countries that have higher test scores at the 
same years of schooling may have higher school 
quality, that is not the only possible interpreta-
tion. It is possible that greater cognitive attain-
ment is due to factors separate from the school but 
that complement educational production. Countries 
with higher tests scores at a given level of schooling 
may have higher parental inputs into their children's 
human capital production; greater endowments of 
child health; tnore favorable community support 
for education; or any number of other factors that 
could affect child learning. It is also possible that 
cognitive attainment and years of schooling are 
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alternative measures of human capital attainment, 
but that the latter measure is subject to more ran-
dom error. The greater weight placed on cognitive 
attainment could be a simple artifact of measure-
ment error. 
An additional concern is that there are relatively 
few developing countries that have participated 
in the international tests used to measure relative 
cognitive attainment by country. Of the sixty-two 
countries that participated in the PISA test, only 
four are LMICs and none are poorer than that. As 
a result, the conclusion that it is cognitive scores 
and not years of schooling that is critical to eco-
nomic growth is based disproportionately on the 
experience of developed countries. 
The World Bank strategy to focus on school qual-
ity rather than expanding enrollment was heavily 
influenced by the finding that measured school out-
put dominates measured time in school as a pre-
dictor of economic growth or individual earnings. 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the 
studies cited in this section only demonstrate that 
cognitive attainment matters for growth, but they 
do not necessarily show that it is improved school 
quality that generates the improvements in cogni-
tion. We will return to that point in the next section, 
after defining the educational production process 
more rigorously. 
How is school quality produced? 
Educational production 
A tretnendous amount of work has been expended 
trying to identify what inputs or strategies make 
schools more efficient at generating human capital. 
A review by G!ewwe et al. (2011) reported that 
there had been over 9,000 studies completed since 
1990! And yet we have few concrete findings that 
would guide a strategy using school quality as a 
way to foster economic development. It is useful 
13 Breton (2011) arb'Ued that when correct empiirical speci-
fications and properly timed measures of school quality are 
used in the estimation, both quality and quantity of schooling 
matter for explaining economic growth. 
14 Castell6-Climent and Hidalgo-Cabrillana (2012) provide 
a different argument: that school quality raises the return to 
schooling and is the cause for rising quantity of schooling. 
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to review a simple model of the educational pro-
duction process that explains why research on this 
topic has proven so frustrating. 
The process of education involves a cooperative 
venture between teacher and student to produce 
educational outcomes, B. 15 The value of B can be 
viewed as the area under the marginal benefit curve 
in Figure 5.1: the PV of all skills produced in school 
over the years the child is in school. Both teachers 
and students get utility from higher levels of B, 
and so they have an incentive to cooperate to pro-
duce more skill. The key cooperative element is 
the willingness of the teacher and the child to allo-
cate time to the school. The proportion of time that 
the teacher attends school is er and the proportion 
of time the child attends is ec. Attendance varies 
between 0 and 1, with 0 meaning never attending 
and 1 meaning attending full-time. The teacher and 
child time interact with school and home inputs to 
produce B according to 
(I) 
where qT and qc are the quality of school inputs 
attached to the teacher and the child. The teacher's 
input quality will depend on the school attributes 
X and the teacher's own attributes, µ 7 : q7 = 
q(X, !LT). The child's input quality will also depend 
on the school attributes and the child's attributes, 
µc: qc = q(X, µc). Relevant teacher attributes 
include ability, training, and socio-economic back-
ground. Relevant child attributes include abil-
ity, health, and socio-economic background. The 
parameter y is a measure of school efficiency in 
converting inputs into cognitive skills and can be 
viewed as a measure of administrative skills avail-
able in the school. The parameter p is a mea-
sure of increases in the substitutability of teacher 
and student inputs in the production of cognitive 
skills. 
This simple model of educational production 
makes it clear why the evidence that cognitive skills 
are more closely tied to growth in earnings or labor 
productivity does not imply that length of time in 
school is less valuable than school quality. Cogni-
tive skills are a direct measure of school output 
B while time in school (ec) is just one of sev-
eral inputs into the production of B. Children with 
identical school effort will nevertheless have very 
different values of B depending on the levels of er, 
µT, f.Lc, X, and y. In addition, one cannot take a 
high realization of B and presume to know which 
one of the inputs er, ec, µT, f.Lc, X, or y is responsi-
ble. Presumably, the most productive schools have 
high values of all of these inputs. 
(!)also explains why despite the 9,000 studies 
of the educational production process reviewed by 
Glewwe et al. (2011) and the thousands that were 
produced before 1990, 16 we have no confidence 
regarding which school inputs are the key ones to 
produce quality. The production process is driven 
by unobservable teacher and child attributes µr, 
and µc, that are offered to the process subject to 
the parents' and teachers' assess1nents of the pro-
duction process. The time in school e7 , and ec, 
is observed on attendance registers, but the actual 
effort expended in learning and teaching is not. 
Furthermore, levels of er and ec are themselves 
chosen based on the expectations of both parties. 
Consequently, schools with the same attributes X 
can produce dramatically different levels of skill B 
depending on the effort expended by teachers and 
students (e7 and ec) and depending on the quality 
of complementary backgrounds that teachers and 
students bring to school (µ 7 and µc ). Even the var-
ious school inputs X are subject to choice because 
their use depends on the children's capacity to learn 
and the teachers' ability to teach. 17 
The most important element of school quality 
is undoubtedly the teacher. An early project by 
Murnane (1975) showed that certain teachers in 
inner-city schools consistently produced classes 
of high-achieving students while their colleagues 
consistently produced inferior results. Thirty years 
later, Rivkin et al. (2005) found the same results in 
Texas. And yet the teachers were indistinguish-
able in terms of education, experience, pay, and 
15 This model is based on Banerjee et al. (2012), who present 
a more detailed version of the joint-attendance decisions of 
teachers and students. Note that one could also couch this 
model as a bargain between schools and households, but the 
discussion is more straightforward when we focus on teacher 
and child. 
16 See reviews by Hanushek ( l986, 1997) for earlier studies 
of the education production process. 
17 In Pakistan, I visited a school with classroom closets full 
of textbooks left in their original paper wrappers while the 
children were left without books. The teachers did not want 
the books to be damaged. 
in-service training. Good teachers had high levels 
of unobserved attributes µT and effort er, and they 
inspired their students to apply high levels of their 
own unobserved attributes µc and effort ec, and yet 
the source of the persistent quality was not identifi-
able by either the econometricians conducting the 
analysis or the administrators setting the compen-
sation policy. 
The 1nost comparable example from a 
developing-country perspective is the study of 
middle-school test performance in China by Lai 
et al. (2011 ). Again, there were large differ-
ences in student performance across schools that 
appear driven by teacher abilities. However, the 
key observable teacher attribute was the teacher's 
rank, which is set by an evaluation process. Stu-
dents taught by higher-ranked teachers performed 
better, but there were no significant relationships 
between student performance and university-
educated teachers, teachers who undertook infor-
mal pedagogical training, or teachers' years of 
experience. We are left with the circular result that 
higher-ranked teachers teach better, and that teacher 
ranking is based on their ability to teach. 
Any effort to raise school quality has to confront 
the decisions that set levels of the key inputs, eT, 
ec, µT, µc, X, and y. The challenge is that most of 
the relevant variation in these inputs across schools 
is not measured by administrative data. Schools 
and teachers with outstanding levels of cognitive 
attainment B will look identical on paper to schools 
and teachers with mediocre results. 
Incentives and effort 
A common problem in developing countries is that 
the teachers shirk their responsibilities. Teacher 
absenteeism averages 19 percent in developing 
countries compared to 5 percent in developed coun-
tries (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Das et al., 2007). 
Moreover, substitute teachers available in devel-
oped countries are largely absent in developing 
countries. Improving school quality in developing 
countries has to confront the problem of shirking 
teachers. 
Teachers are paid w7 as long as they are not 
caught shirking. The probability of being caught 
shirking and then being fired is a, a E [O, 1}. The 
teacher can also earn an alternative wage outside 
Education 287 
their teaching obligations, wo7 . Therefore the 
teacher faces a budget constraint composed of what 
they can earn in and out of school: 
Wr =(I - a(l - er ))wr + (1 - er )wor (2) 
If teachers get utility from the attainment of their 
students and they take the child's attendance as 
determined, their attendance decision is governed 
by 
' ( p P)l_J p I UT(B) qyeT + qcec /! qyeT-
' as 
= Ur(b)- = wor - awr 
aer 
(3) 
The left-hand side of (3) is the marginal utility 
the teacher gets from spending additional time 
in school and producing added cognitive attain-
ment in the child and the right-hand side is the 
amount the teacher could earn if that same time 
were instead spent in an alternative activity net of 
any expected lost earnings from teaching if caught 
shirking. The condition encapsulates many of the 
issues surrounding the debate on school quality in 
both developing and developed countries. If teach-
ers are held responsible for shirking (a is set at a 
high level, so the expected penalty from poor per-
fonnance is high), then teachers will attend more 
regularly. On the other hand, teachers will also 
attend more regularly if they are paid more ( wr is set 
at a high level). Teachers also attend more regularly 
if the school offers high-quality inputs (high levels 
of X), or if the teacher values child learning highly 
(high level of U~(B)). But the other implication of 
(3) is that anything that raises child attendance 
will cause teachers to attend more regularly as 
well. 
The child's decisions are symmetric. The child 
can earn a wage woc(B) if the child works rather 
than attending school, where the child labor wage 
is conditional on the child's cognitive attainment 
to date. The condition setting how much time the 
child will attend is: 
U
' (S) as _ (1 - ec)awoc as 
c -- -woc-a~ as a~ 
(4) 
The left-hand side of (4) is the marginal urility 
from additional cognitive attainment from spend-
ing more time in school, while the right-hand side 
is the earnings from spending time in the child 
labor market net of the lost opportunity to raise the 
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opportunity wage even more by spending additional 
time in school. The child attends more regularly if 
child labor is prohibited and if cognitive attainment 
is highly valued. High-quality school and teacher 
inputs raise the marginal product of child time in 
school, which both increases the utility from time 
in school and Jowers the value of time in child 
labor which increases child attendance. In partic-
ular, anything that raises teacher attendance will 
raise child attendance as well. 
We can now summarize the options available 
to policy-makers trying to improve school quality. 
Those include: 
• Improve school inputs, X 
• Improve school efficiency, y 
• Raise teacher attendance, ey, by raising wages, 
wr, or by increasing monitoring for shirking, a 
• Raise child attendance, ec, by lowering child 
opportunity wage, woe, or by raising the antici-
pated return to schooling, %e~ 
• Improve child health or other elements of socio-
economic background, µc. 
We will review the prospects for cost-effective 
interventions for each of these in tum. 
What are the prospects for getting 
a reasonable return from improving 
school quality? 
Investing in improved school characteristics, X 
Perhaps because countries attempt to standardize 
the inputs they allocate to schools, there is not 
much evidence that variation in school charac-
teristics alter learning outcomes to a significant 
degree. By and large, schools have the same text-
books and materials, classroom buildings, and cur-
ricula, at least on paper. 'fhat lack of variation 
makes it difficult to evaluate whether changes in the 
input mix would affect learning outcomes. Glewwe 
et al. (2011) concluded that children perform bet-
ter in schools with adequate desks and a perma-
nent structure as compared to sitting on mats in the 
open air, but most children already have access to 
those minimal school attributes. Glewwe and Kre-
mer (2006) did suggest that developing countries 
probably underinvested in schooling compared to 
developed countries, but they did not have strong 
suggestions for how additional monies might be 
spent. 
In times past when there were many underservect 
children lacking access to a nearby school, the 
case for large public building efforts may have 
been more compelling. l~hat was the case with 
the Rosenwald schools. That was also the case in 
Indonesia in the 1970s, where Dufto (2001) showed 
that a 1najor eJ-lort to expand primary-school access 
in Indonesia had a large impact on enrollments and, 
over time, a modest but significant impact on earn-
ings as well. As we showed on p. 273, however, the 
vast majority of children in the world have access 
to a school and spend at least some time in it. Even 
if we had better understanding of the productivity 
of various inputs, it is doubtful that we would get 
sufficient improvements in learning outcomes to 
pay back the costs of further investments in school 
infrastructure. 
Improving school quality by improving school 
management, y 
As early as 1962, international agencies such as the 
United Nations and the World Bank were advising 
that the decentralization of public service deliv-
ery could serve as a development strategy. The 
move toward more local control is motivated by 
the belief that decentralized control will result in 
better school outcomes, holding constant the level 
of resources devoted to the school. Local decision-
makers should have more information on local 
needs and conditions, and could adjust resource 
allocations accordingly. Central dictates that arc 
aimed at maximizing welfare on average may over-
supply the service in some areas and undersupply 
it in others. Local officials should better respond to 
local needs because they are more exposed to pres-
sure from constituents and because they may use 
quality public services to attract or retain residents. 
Tempting as it is to assume that we can spend 
the same amount on schooling and get better out-
comes if we only managed schools better, evidence 
that we can raise y by shifting responsibility from 
the Ministry of Education to local school man-
agers is decidedly mixed. In the case of schooling 
outcomes, even the 1nost supportive studies tend 
to argue that decentralization helps some schools 
but not others. There are numerous reasons why 
}ocal control may yield poor outcomes. Bardhan 
(2005) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) argue 
that autonomous decisions are particularly prone 
to fail in developing countries. First, populations 
rnaY not be mobile, and so households may not 
rnove because of poor-quality public services. Sec-
ond, local officials may be subjected to undue in'flu-
ence by prominent local families seeking to divert 
public resources towards their private needs. A 
related problem is that there may be no tradition of 
monitoring of local officials by local residents, so 
presumptions of greater accountability with local 
control may not hold in fact. Finally, local offi-
cials may lack the necessary experience or skills 
to manage resources in countries with few well-
educated professionals. Any one of these problems 
could create difficulties for decentralized school 
systems. 
A more fundamental concern is that any effort 
to devolve authority to the local school level will 
require that local school principals, teachers, par-
ents, or community leaders choose to exert effort 
to manage the school. This point was driven home 
by Gunnarsson et al. (2009), who found that most 
of the variation in school autonomy was within 
countries and not between countries. Even sup-
posedly centrally managed school systems have 
some degree of local participation while suppos-
edly locally managed systems often have deci-
sions dictated by central authorities. As a result, 
localities only participate actively in decentraliza-
tion initiatives if it is in their interest to do so. 
In Latin America, more local authority was exer-
cised by schools in localities with more-educated 
parents and more-remote locations (Gunnarsson 
et al., 2009). In Argentina, the best outcomes from 
a decentralization initiative were in districts that 
responded quickest and were in wealthier areas 
Galiani et al., 2008). In El Salvador, benefits of 
decentralization were found in the schools that took 
up an offer of greater autonomy, but not all schools 
opted in (King and Ozier, 2001). 
The key benefit of decentralization is supposed 
to be that resources will be used more efficiently. 
However, that requires both capable and ethical 
public servants at all levels of the government. 
Unethical local authorities 111ay take advantage of 
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their increased freedom to transfer resources away 
from their efficient uses. In Uganda, only 13 percent 
of bloc funding for decentralized schools ended 
up at the schools while the rest disappeared in the 
bureaucratic maze (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004 ). 
Hanushek et al. (2011) examined the role of 
decentralization on student outcomes across forty-
two countries that participated in the PISA inter-
national tests. They conclude that decentralization 
increases test scores in developed countries and 
countries with well-developed managerial capa-
city in education. However, decentralization low-
ers student outcomes in poorer countries and coun-
tries that lack institutional capacity to manage 
schools. Their cross-country results are consis-
tent with the findings within countries that decen-
tralization works best in the best-managed and 
most-educated communities. Losers tend to be the 
districts with the weakest managerial capacity and 
the poorest and least-educated parents. 
These findings suggest that decentralization 
ought to be offered but not mandated. Only those 
conununities or districts that expect to benefit 
will participate. The poorest and least-educated 
communities will opt not to participate, the com-
1nunities that would be banned if the decentral-
ization were mandated by the central authority. 
Because I can not advocate a universal move toward 
increased local autonomy, I do not believe that this 
option would pass muster on a global benefit-cost 
criterion. 
Raising teacher attendance by improving 
compensation (wr) or increasing monitoring (a) 
We know that teachers are important for school 
quality and that teacher absenteeism is a common 
problem in developing countries. A na'ive view 
would be to contend that if teachers are paid to 
teach, then public expenditures are already in place 
and one need only compel the teachers to show up 
for work. But teacher absenteeism has been recog-
nized as a problem for decades, and yet ft persists. 
Governments either lack the will to enforce con-
tractual obligations; or they lack the resources to 
monitor teacher performance; or they view teacher 
postings more as investments in political patron-
age than human capital development. It seems clear 
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that the solution to teacher absenteeism will not be 
found by asking governments to continue doing 
what they are currently doing, but with more dili-
gence. 
Several effo11s have attempted to improve the 
monitoring of teacher attendance. Dufto et al. 
(2010) report on an experiment where teachers in 
a one-teacher school were asked to have a stu-
dent take a picture with a date stamped on the 
photo. Teachers were paid a bonus depending on 
how many days they attended. Absenteeism was 
44 percent before the program was instituted and 
fell to 21 percent afterward while remaining above 
40 percent in a set of control schools. The improve-
ment persisted over time, increasing the time stu-
dents had access to a present teacher by 30 percent. 
Student performance was 0.17 standard deviations 
higher in the schools with the cameras than in the 
control schools. 
Unfortunately this solution has only limited 
application. It works in cases in remote schools 
where monitoring teacher attendance is costly. It 
is also important to note that these teachers were 
not part of the government system where bureau-
cratic rules would undoubtedly conspire to restrict 
its use. Indeed the authors also followed a similar 
scheme used to monitor the absenteeism of govern-
ment nurses. At first, nurses' absenteeism fell by 
half, similar to the finding for the teachers. But soon 
the government began allowing exceptions to the 
monitoring program and lax enforcement caused a 
reversal of the initial improvements. 
This divergence of outcomes between similar 
interventions applied to teachers in government 
postings versus teachers hired outside the civil ser-
vice bureaucracy is a recurring theme in the devel-
opment literature. Teacher attendance in private 
schools is much more regular than in government 
schools despite higher pay in government schools. 
Dufto et al. (2009) report on Kenya's Extra Teacher 
Program, which provided funds to hire additional 
teachers on a contract basis to be used in grades 
1 and 2. Despite the reduced class size, children 
assigned to civil servant teachers in the schools 
receiving extra teachers scored no better than those 
in schools without the additional teachers. The 
apparent reason is that from an already abysmal 
attendance rate of 58 percent, civil service teachers 
reduced their attendance an additional 13 percent~ 
age points in schools that received extra teachers 
Meanwhile, the contract teachers attended mor~ 
frequently than civil service teachers despite being 
paid 25 percent of the civil service rate. Students 
taught by the contract teachers attended more fre~ 
quently and scored 0.23 standard deviations higher 
on tests than did students taught by the civil service 
teachers in the same schools. 
A similar program was instituted in Andhra 
Pradesh province in India (Muralidharan and Sun-
dararaman, 2010). Teachers on fixed-term, renew-
able contracts lacking the professional training nor-
mally required for a civil service posting were hired 
and randomly posted to 100 government schools. 
Pay was on a par with private school salaries, but 
only one-fifth the pay of the civil service teach-
ers. Nevertheless, attendance by contract teach-
ers was significantly higher than for civil service 
teachers (84 percent versus 73 percent). Students 
in schools receiving the extra teacher performed 
significantly better in tests of mathematics and lan-
guage. An earlier study by Banerjee et al. (2007) 
found that contract teachers who provided tutor-
ing to weak students significantly raised the per-
formance of those children in the current year and 
the effect remained significant but smaller once the 
tutoring ended. A third study in Uttar Pradesh and 
Bihar by Atherton and Kingdon (2010) also found 
that contract teachers attended more regularly, per~ 
fanned better, and at a third of the civil service pay 
standard. 
The Indian cases demonstrate a significant chal-
lenge to school reformers. In private schools, 
teacher performance is closely tied to pay, but not in 
government schools (Kingdon and Teal, 2007). In 
private schools, teacher attributes such as tenure on 
the job, scores on tests, and pedagogical methods 
affect students' performance, but not so in govern-
ment schools (Aslam and Kingdon, 2011). Union-
ized teachers are paid more, but perform worse 
in the classroom (Kingdon and Teal, 2010). Why 
then would a move toward contract teachers not be 
warranted? 
There are two main concerns that suggest that 
the use of contract teachers will only be a short-
term solution. First, it is not sustainable to maintain 
two teaching cadres, one that is highly paid, enjoys 
security, and has no expectation of perfor-
and a second that is poorly paid, has no job 
and is expected to make up for the failings 
the first group. At some point, one would have 
ask why the government continues to employ the 
service teaching cadre. If the contract teachers 
a threat, the civil service teachers will press 
tiave the system disabled. 18 Replacing the civil 
teachers with contract teachers is a political 
The second concern is that if the contract system 
he<;ornes regularized so that there are two teaching 
svsterns, the contract system will eventually adopt 
the rules that have made the civil service system 
non-functioning. Once contract teachers become 
regular teachers, why would their performance not 
revert to the civil service standard? In fact, the 
superior performance of contract teachers may be 
a transitory phenomenon if the contract teachers 
ultimately expect to become civil service teachers. 
If contract teachers discover they will never gain 
a permanent posting, would their superior perfor-
mance continue? 
Nor does decentralized control of the schools 
appear to offer a solution to civil service teacher 
absenteeism. Banerjee et al. (2010) review a series 
of efforts in India designed to improve commu-
nity monitoring of schools and teachers in the vil-
lage. Village Education Committees (VEC) com-
posed of parents, the village head, and the head 
teacher are empowered to monitor teacher perfor-
mance and to request school resources from the 
education district The experiments attempted to 
improve the capacity of the VEC to manage the 
schools. One intervention was aimed at informing 
the village about the function and power of the 
VEC to manage the school. A second added train-
ing in administering and interpreting literacy tests 
that would give the village an independent assess-
ment of children's progress in the school. The third 
added an additional component that trained volun-
teers to provide supplemental reading instruction 
after school. None of the interventions significantly 
affected teacher attendance. Children who attended 
the afterschool reading classes did improve their 
reading skills, but there were no apparent enhanced 
learning outcomes related to the teacher's actions. 
These disappointing outcomes mirror the findings 
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from efforts to decentralize discussed in the pre-
vious section: local control is difficult to foster in 
areas that lack managerial capacity and educated 
parents. 19 
The most plausible solution is to tie teacher pay 
to performance, the subject of an experimental eval-
uation conducted by Muralidharan and Sundarara-
man (201 la) in Andhra Pradesh province, India. 
The program offered a bonus averaging 3 percent 
of annual pay to civil service teachers based on the 
average improvement of their students' test scores 
in an independently administered exam. Despite 
the modest cost increment, student performance 
was 0.27 standard deviations higher in mathemat-
ics and 0.17 standard deviations higher in languages 
compared to students in schools without the bonus. 
In addition, students performed better in sciences 
and social studies. The gains came despite the fact 
that teacher attendance was no higher in the bonus 
schools. On the other hand, teachers apparently 
used their in-class time more effectively and their 
students were given more out-of-class assignments 
to work at home or in teacher-administered sup-
plementary sessions. Furthermore, teachers appear 
to have been accepting of the bonus payment sys-
tem, especially younger teachers who had lower 
initial pay. Interestingly, teachers who expressed 
the greatest support ex ante were the ones whose 
students performed the best ex post, suggesting that 
the most able teachers are the ones who are com-
fortable with performance pay. 
This most favorable outcome serves as a coun-
terpoint to a similar experiment attempted in Kenya 
(Glewwe et al., 2010). Teachers were offered a 
reward amounting to 2-4 percent of annual pay 
18 In both Kenya and Andhra Pradesh, the perceived need 
to add teachers led to proposals to expand the civil service 
ranks substantially, so the policy was to expand the underper-
forming ranks while limiting the size of the contract teacher 
program. 
19 An expert on educational decentralization confided to 
me that, in his experience, every successful effort to fos-
ter parental control over local schools involved ~pport of 
the parents' activities by an NGO commissioned to carry out 
the project. Once the project ended and the NGO exited, the 
parental control would fall apart, suggesting that it was the 
NGO that had effectively exerted authority over the local 
school. 
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based on their students' test scores, with penal-
ties applied if students did not take the exam. 
Performance on the exam increased, but perfor-
mance on other exams showed no improvement. 
Performance did not persist beyond the current 
school year. Neither teacher nor student attendance 
was affected. The one significant behavioral change 
was that time spent preparing for the incentivized 
exa1n increased in 88 percent of the schools where 
bonuses were offered. 
It is tempting to use the Indian case to support 
a move toward bonus pay. The cost was modest 
compared to the benefits of increased cognitive 
development. However the Kenya experience sug-
gests that the case for a broad-based adoption of 
performance-based pay is premature. 
This is the stage where Lant Pritchett departs 
from my suggested strategy, arguing in his Alterna-
tive Perspective Paper (Chapter 5.1) that the case for 
improvements in school management and improved 
teacher incentives promise the highest returns. We 
differ in our assessment of whether the current state 
of evidence is sufficiently strong to advocate a gen-
eral move toward strategies such as those summa-
rized on pp. 288-91. I encourage readers to exam-
ine his arguments advocating a focus on improving 
school quality, in both Chapter 5.1 and in his forth-
coming book on the subject (Pritchett, 2013).20 
Lowering child opportunity wage (Woe!, raising 
the return to schooUng ( i~. ), or improving the 
child's socio-economic status (µc) 
Providing information on the true returns 
to schooling 
One of the barriers to schooling is that parents and 
children do not have a grasp of the true returns 
to education. This is particularly true in rural or 
remotely sited schools where it is more difficult to 
observe how education can raise lifetime earnings. 
As Schultz argued in his essay on the role of human 
capital in disequilibria (Schultz, 1975), traditional 
farm households are efficient given what they know 
about their markets and technologies, but they are 
poor because those traditional markets and meth-
ods do not allow for much more than subsistence. A 
production analysis confirms that formal schooling 
does not have a return in traditional rural house .. 
holds (Fafcharnps and Quisurnbing, 1999) tied to 
migration to an urban market where skills and spe~ 
cialization are rewarded. 
Supportive evidence is found in the fact that 
rural enrollments react positively to the possibil ... 
ity of migrating to nearby urban markets (TanseI 
2002) or to higher observed returns in those mar~ 
kets (Kochar, 2004). Boucher et al. (2005) found 
that rising returns to education in Mexico following 
the installation of the PROGRESA rural conditional 
cash-transfer (CCT) program (discussed on p. 293) 
is largely attributed to the migration of the more-
educated rural workers to urban markets. It seems 
that knowledge of returns to schooling in other mar .. 
kets and the ability and willingness to commute to 
those markets is critical to school enrollments and 
attendance in more remote locations. 
Orazem and Tesfatsion ( 1997) demonstrated that 
when children based their expectations of returns to 
schooling on their parents' experiences rather than 
global information on returns to schooling, ineffi-
cient human capital investments resulted. In devel-
oped countries, the empirical research on impacts 
of neighborhoods on schooling decisions of disad-
vantaged youth is mixed at best (Oreopoulos, 2003; 
Lang, 2007). However, information on returns to 
schooling are easily observed in developed coun-
tries, but less so in developing countries. An inex-
pensive way to increase child attendance may be 
to provide children and their parents with accurate 
information about the value of education. 
Jensen (2010) found that 8th-grade boys had 
a very low subjective estimate of the returns to 
schooling in the Dominican Republic. A rando1n 
sample of these boys were given correct infor-
mation on returns. The result was a significant 
20 My quibble with a key argument advanced by Pritchett 
concerns the exercise whereby cognitive attainment by chil-
dren in the poorest-performing schools is compared to their 
attainment had they learned at the pace of the children in 
the best-performing schools. Pritchett argues that the source 
of the gap is due to underperlormance of the schools, and 
he may be correct. But it is also possible that the children 
perform poorly in the "bad" schools because they lack the 
inputs that complement schooling such as adequate nutri-
tion, health, or family support of schooling, in which case 
they would still under perform in the "good" school. 
increase in persistence to graduation fro1n high 
school of 9 percentage points for those whose sub-
jective returns were increased to the true rate of 
retum. Nguyen (2008) conducted a similar exper-
iwent on primary students in Madagascar. Grade 
4 students in schools where they and their parents 
were given information on the returns to schooling 
increased their attendance by 3.5 percentage points 
and increased their test scores by 0.2 standard devi-
ations. 
With only limited experience with these inter-
ventions, it is premature to propose a global pro-
gram of infonning parents and children about the 
troe returns to schooling. And yet it would be dif-
ficult to devise a less-expensive intervention and 
one with virtually no chance of unintended conse-
quences. In the Madagascar case, Nguyen repo1ted 
that the cost was just 8 cents per student! If children 
increase their intensity of effort in school as a result 
of being told the best estimates of the true returns in 
the local and inore retnote labor markets, it would 
have to meet a benefit-cost criteria. 
CCTs for school attendance 
The most widely studied development intervention 
over the past fifteen years has been to tie desired 
household behaviors to the receipt of cash or in-
k.ind transfers from the government. Fiszbein et al. 
(2009) listed twenty-eight countries that had ini-
tiated at least a pilot program since 1997 includ-
ing virtually all Latin American countries, four in 
Africa, six in Asia, and two in the Middle East. The 
programs are targeted to households in the low-
est socio-economic strata. In most cases, coverage 
includes 20 percent or less of the country's popu-
lation. The targeting is pragmatic as the countries 
cannot afford to extend the benefits to all. The poor-
est are the group that is most likely to underinvest 
in their children's schooling because of liquidity 
constraints, and the amount of the transfer neces-
sary to induce the desired behavior will be smallest 
in households with the lowest opportunity costs of 
time. Perhaps because the programs focus so inten-
sively on the poorest social strata, benefits have 
shown little evidence of leakage to the non-poor. 
The CCT programs typically require that child 
attendance in school meet a threshold level of 
80 percent per month or more. They may also 
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require that the children receive periodic health 
assessments at a local clinic and receive timely 
vaccinations, that the mothers receive training in 
nutrition and health, and that the mothers par-
ticipate in perinatal care and receive training in 
early childhood development. As a result, the CCTs 
become an "umbrella program" aimed at incentiviz-
ing a broad an·ay of desired behaviors believed to 
improve private and social outcomes. The transfers 
themselves are aimed at lowering the incidence of 
poverty and inequality in the society. 
Few interventions have been subjected to so 
many rigorous evaluations that allow us to eval-
uate the outcomes relative to a baseline collected 
before the conditional transfers were implemented 
and that include randomized participants and con-
trols. As such, the evidence of the outcomes of 
these programs should be particularly reliable for 
assessing whether further expansion is warranted. 
First, the program has been applied to some of the 
poorest countries (Bangladesh, Burkina Faso) as 
well as countries that are relatively well off (Chile, 
Argentina). The transfers are typically modest, rep-
resenting I 0 percent of pre-transfer household con-
sumption levels or less.21 Median administrative 
costs including management, monitoring, and eval-
uation across ten programs evaluated by Grosh et al. 
(2008) came to 8 percent of the total costs which 
was lower than the administrative costs for other 
social assistance programs. The programs' trans-
fer mechanisms have been adaptable to the level 
of financial sophistication in the country - from the 
use of debit cards readable at ATMs in Brazil to pay-
ments distributed through the post office or through 
village leadership. In short, CCTs have been 
quite flexibly applied to countries at all stages of 
development. 
The Fiszbein et al. (2009) review summarizes 
how households have responded to these incentives. 
First, the transfers raised per capita consumption in 
all the countries evaluated, the primary aim of the 
poverty alleviation aspect of the program. In four 
of five countries with necessary data, expenditure 
shares on food rose significantly, su~gesting that 
the transfers helped households meet their basic 
21 The highest transfers were in Mexico and Nicaragua, aver-
aging about one-third of pre-transfer consumption. 
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Table 5.3 Estimated short-run effect of CTTs on child 
time in school, by country 
Country Age/Grade Impact (0Ai) 0 Transfer(%) 
Bangladesh 
Cambodia 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Pakistan 
Turkey 
11-18 (girls} 
Grade 7-9 
Age 6-15 
Age 8-13 
Age14-17 
Age 6-17 
Age 6-13 
Age 7-17 
Grade 0---5 
Grade 6 
Grade 7-9 
Age 7-13 
Primary girls 
Primary 
Secondary 
27 0.6 
33 2.5 
12 7 
2 17 
9 17 
14 10 
5 9 
3 10 
2 20 
19 20 
20 
18 27 
38 3 
-3 6 
13 6 
Note: a Bold values are significant at the I 0% level or more. 
Source: Authors' compilation of results reported in Table 5.1 of 
Fiszbein et al. (2009). 
needs. In most countries, the incidence of health 
care visits and vaccinations for children in recipient 
households increased significantly. These results 
are important because they suggest that even before 
we consider child time in school, CCTs improve 
child health, nutrition, and socio-economic status. 
We learned on pp. 275-7 that these are factors that 
increase returns to schooling, at least in theory. 
As for time in school, the evidence consis-
tently supports the view that CCTs increase time 
in school. The short-term effects of the program 
are summarized for eleven countries in Table 5.3. 
In almost all cases, households increase their chil-
dren's time in school in response to the CCT. Within 
countries, the largest impacts are found among the 
poorest households that are the most likely to face 
liquidity constraints that would inefficiently limit 
the time their children spend in school. Larger 
effects are found in rural areas where children face 
the highest opportunity cost ofti1ne in school. Con-
sistently where evaluated, we find that the increased 
child time in school is accompanied by a reduced 
incidence of child labor. In one case in Brazil, the 
biggest decline was in the most hazardous forms of 
child labor (Yap et al., 2009). 
The Brazil case is useful because it is the largest 
CCT program. It also began as a municipality-led 
innovation and so it was implemented only grad-
ually over time until it became a national plan. 
While it was not subject to an experimental design, 
Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) were able to evalu-
ate its impacts on student outcomes by exploiting 
variation across municipalities in the ti1ning of its 
implementation and program expansion. The pro-
gram significantly reduced dropout, raised the pro-
motion rate, and increased primary enrollment by 
6 percent. 
Less certain is whether more time in school 
results in better cognitive development. Few stud-
ies have examined the effect of receiving a CCT 
on test scores. Ponce and Bedi (2008) found no 
difference in 2nd-grade test scores between recipi-
ent and non-recipient children in Ecuador, but it is 
not clear that differences would show up that early 
in the primary cycle. More importantly, the test 
score is administered to children in school which 
means that time in school is held constant for recip-
ient and non-recipient children. If CCTs increase 
cognitive attainment by increasing time in school, 
this study would fail to capture any effect. A study 
of adolescent girls who were exposed to a CCT 
program in Malawi (Baird et al., 2011) found sig-
nificantly higher performance in tests of English, 
mathematics, and cognitive attainment. It is plau-
sible that the more positive evidence of cognitive 
improvements in Malawi are due to their inclusion 
of girls out of school as well as those still in school 
into the study. The girls receiving CCTs had more 
time in school relative to the control girls, and that 
additional time may be responsible for their higher 
test scores. Furthermore, by middle school, differ-
ences in academic attainment are easier to measure 
than they are in the 2nd grade. 
The only long-term experimental measure 
of the effects of conditional transfers was 
reported by Behrman et al. (2011) for the PRO-
GRESA/Oportunidades program in Mexico. 
Youths aged 9-15 when first exposed to the CCT 
program were aged 15-21 when an evaluation was 
made of their labor market and educational out-
comes. Boys who were exposed to the program at 
9 ended up completing a year more of schooling age . 
than did boys without the program. The magn1tude 
f the effect decreases as the length of exposure 0 l" decreases. Girls exposed to the p~ogram. ear i.est 
eceived 0.7 more years of schooling while guls 
:x.posed at older ages experienced ~o ~ifference _in 
schooling. Child labor decreased significantly for 
boys but not girls after exposure to the program. 
Exposure to the program significantly lowered the 
robability of working in agriculture, meaning that p d . . 
the additional schooling encourage migration out 
of traditional employment. This is consistent with 
the role Schultz (1975) proposed for education of 
rural peoples - to allow them to adapt to chang-
ing economic opportunities - and is consistent 
with the Boucher et al. (2005) finding that the 
most educated rural youth are moving to urban 
markets. 
What does the CCT have to do with school qual-
ity? Child attendance complements other school 
inputs, and so child cognitive attainment should 
be enhanced by more regular attendance. In addi-
tion, as shown in (3), teacher attendance will also 
increase with child attendance to the extent that 
teachers view cognitive attainment as a shared 
good with their students. Unfortunately, we do not 
have any studies that have examined what happens 
to teacher attendance in the presence of a CCT 
program aimed at their students, and so that link 
between child and teacher attendance must remain 
conjectural.22 
It is important to note that the substantial 
increases in attendance related to the elimination 
of school fees reported in Table 5.1 did not erode 
learning outcomes in Africa, even when class sizes 
rose substantially. One would have expected that 
the addition of more children to existing schools 
would disadvantage those already in school, but 
that does not appear to have happened. One would 
also expect that the added children disproportion-
ately come from more disadvantaged backgrounds 
and so they should underperform those who would 
have attended without an intervention, but that does 
not appear to be the case. Government schools 
were apparently able to adapt to the rising demand, 
even if resources were not added proportional to 
the increased enrollments. Similarly, rising demand 
for schooling induced by CCT programs or by 
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improved information on returns to schooling do 
not appear to have lessened school quality. These 
results are consistent with a model where teach-
ers respond positively to an increased demand for 
their services, but actual proof will require further 
study. 
Benefit-cost comparisons of the most 
promising strategies 
We can now return to the initial challenge posed 
on p. 278: do any of these interventions dom-
inate a competing strategy aimed at improving 
child health? The answer is almost certainly no. 
Health interventions undertaken before school-
ing age, whether nutritional supplements, anti-
parasitics, anti-microbials, or vaccinations, can 
insure the proper brain development necessary to 
optimize time in school. The cost of such pro-
grams is often quite modest and the gains last a 
lifetime. One could pair these interventions with 
schooling as the child ages by tying their distri-
bution to the school. I would hesitate to suggest 
withholding the treatments only to regular atten-
dees of the school, however, as the benefits of the 
health improvement alone is adequate justification 
for the treatment, independent of the complemen-
tary effects on schooling. Nevertheless, a program 
that combines CCTs for student attendance with 
improved information on the returns to school-
ing and school-based health programs represents 
a compelling package of complementary interven-
tions that simultaneously address current poverty, 
health, nutrition, and human capital development. 
If the resulting boost to attendance results in a com-
plementary increase in the quality of schooling pro-
vided by teachers who attend more regularly, the 
BCR becomes that much more attractive. 
In Table 5.4, I present the benefits and costs of 
the three strategies that I believe offer the best evi-
dence of success to date - nutrition supplements, 
offering information on returns to schooling, and 
" 
22 An exception is Banerjee et al. (2012), who find that 
the single most important factor explaining primary-teacher 
attendance in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan is 
the attendance of their pupils. 
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Table 5.4 BCRs from various interventions affecting schooling 
Low-discount (3%) Hrgh-d1scount (5%) "' 
~~~~~~~~~~~- ' 
Benefita Cost5 BCR Benefit Cost :f 
($) {$) ($) ($) BCR !§' 
Health and nutrition programs 
Bolivia pre-school (Behrman et al., 2004) 5,107 1,394 3.7 3,230 1,301 2.5 
Kenya worms (Miguel and Kremer, 2004) 1,560 3.5 445.7 646 3.5 184.6 
Kenya pre-school (Vermeersch and Kremer, 2005) 1,560 29.1 53.6 646 28.6 22.fi 
Iron supplements (Knowles and Behrman, 2005) 474 10.5 45.1 330 10.3 32.0 
India worms (Babonis et al., 2006) 2,201 112.0 19.7 868 112.0 7.8 
Guatemala (Damon and Glewwe, 2009) 622 52 12.0 30[ 51 5.9 
Information on returns 
Madagascar (Nguyen, 2008) 3,349 2.30 1456 1,455 2.30 632.6 
Dominican Republic (Jensen, 2010) 7734 417 18.6 3356 417 8.1 
CCTs 
Mexico (Behrman et al., 2011) 2,679 500 5.4 1,082 390 2.8 
Nicaragua (Maluccio, 2009) 6,003 1,574 3.8 4,412 [574 2.8 
Honduras (Glewwe et al., 2004) 9,178 266 34.5 4,064 219 18.6 
Colombia (Attanasio et al, 2005) 
Urban ages 8-13 9395 l.916 4.9 3168 1898 1.7 
Urban ages 14--17 9395 767 12.2 5,957 759 7.8 
Rural ages 8-13 9395 767 12.2 3168 759 4.2 
Rural ages 14--17 9395 479 19.6 5,957 474 12.6 
Ecuador (Schady and Araujo, 2008) 9100 572 15.9 4665 572 8.2 
Chile (Galasso, 2011) 
Urban ages 6-15 0--21504c 542 0--39.7c 0-9903c 446 0--22.2c 
Rural ages 6--15 0' 542 0.0 O' 446 0.0 
Cambodia (Filmer and Schady, 2009) 1,849 709 2.6 939 709 l.3 
Oi&"°"~P.i« 
Notes: 
"Benefits are the PV from an additional year of schooling evaluated over a forty-year work career, evaluated at the average annual wage in 
the country. 
b Costs are the PV of inducing I additional year of schooling. 
c Estimated impact of schooling was not significantly different fonn 0 in some specifications. Estimates in rnral areas were insignificant or 
negative. 
CCTs. All have been shown to succeed with bene-
fits that do1ninate costs. 
Interested readers can request my detailed com-
putations. My strategy was to first compute the cost 
of inducing an added year of schooling. These were 
discounted back to the first period of the interven-
tion. I then imputed the PV of an added year of 
schooling over a forty-year work career. For very 
early interventions such as those in pre-school or 
primary grades, I assumed that the work career 
began at age 15. For the others, I assumed it 
began at the end of the intervention. Returns to 
induced schooling were computed using the returns 
to schooling for each country that were estimated 
for the King et al. (2012) study. Average wages 
in the country were computed using those same 
datasets. Therefore, the stream of returns from the 
intervention reflects the imputed gain from a worker 
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"fable 5.5 Incidence of malnutrition, by region and income level, most recent measure available 
% of children under 
0/o of infants born with 5 who are o/o of population % of households that 
low b1rthwe1ght malnourrshed0 undernounshed use iodized salt 
Jlegion 
Bast Asitt/Pacific 6.0 
Latin America/Caribbean 8.4 
South Asia 27.3 
SSA 13.7 
Middle East/N01ih Africa 10.4 
Income level 
Low~income 15.4 
LMIC 21.0 
Middle-income 15.2 
Upper-middle-income 5.4 
World 15.2 
Note: " Measured by height for age. 
19.3 
2.0 
47.5 
41.8 
23.2 
44.5 
41.8 
30.4 
12.6 
31.8 
10.6 
8.9 
20.3 
22.2 
29.5 
16.5 
12.5 
8.5 
12.9 
86.8 
52.3 
68.9 
62.8 
54.2 
72.3 
91.4 
70.7 
Source: World Bank, World Development J11dica1or:s and Global Development Finance. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/ 
world-development-indicators. 
having one more year of schooling compared to the 
average worker in the country. 
There are several caveats to this procedure. First, 
not all papers reported increases in years of school-
ing as a result of the intervention, and so I had 
to generate an implied gain in years of schooling 
from reported increases in enrollment or attendance 
rates. Second, this method assumes that all returns 
come from increased years of schooling, but we 
know from p. 275 that the larger gains may come 
from increa5ed human capital produced per year of 
schooling. As a result, these estimated returns are 
likely to be overly conservative as they ignore gains 
in the pace of cognitive develop1nent of the children 
while in school. Also, I do not add in likely exter-
nal benefits from increased schooling in the form 
of reduced incidence of early pregnancy, lower 
incidence of criminal activity, improved health, or 
improved mobility of labor. 
Several general findings are apparent. First, 
the climate for these interventions are better in 
economies with strong returns to schooling than in 
those where returns to schooling are depressed by 
poor government institutions. Therefore, the best 
places to try these interventions are countries that 
protect individual economic and political freedoms. 
Of course those countries would also have the bet-
ter capacity to implement an intervention, whether 
distributing medication, CCTs, or information on 
the returns to schooling. Therefore my earlier com-
ments regarding failed states apply to these inter-
ventions as welL Perhaps there is a menu of inter-
ventions one could apply to failed states, but it is 
unlikely to involve a coordinated government effort 
to improve schooling outcomes. 
Second, nutrition or health interventions are 
much less expensive than are CCT programs. 
Perhaps that is why the CCT programs are 
concentrated in wealthier countries while the nutri-
tion programs typically focus on the poorest. In 
fact, CCT programs require at least some mini-
mum level of development to be feasible because 
they require a large enough population of the rela-
tively well-off to subsidize those at the bottom of 
the income distribution. If the entire population is 
poor, redistribution is impossible (Table 5.5). 
Related to that is that the requirement that bene-
fits outweigh costs requires that the Il){lre expen-
sive interventions be applied in relatively more 
developed economies. Returns come from induced 
returns to additional years of schooling. As thou-
sands of Mincerian earnings function studies have 
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found, log-wages are approximately linear in years 
of schooling, and so wage levels rise at an increas-
ing rate as years of schooling increase. That means 
that increasing schooling by one year in a coun-
try where average schooling is at the primary level 
or less will generate a relatively stnall stream of 
benefits compared to an added year of schooling 
in a country where average schooling is at the sec-
ondary level. Only relatively inexpensive interven-
tions can be tried in the poorest and least-developed 
countries. 
Finally, the appropriateness of one type of inter-
vention versus another also reflects the proximate 
cause for poor educational outcomes in the area. 
Not surprisingly, micro-nutrient interventions and 
deworming strategies will be most effective where 
those problems are most severe. As shown in 
Table 5.4, that would be in the poorest countries 
and in South Asia and SSA. Those interventions 
also tend to have the largest benefits relative to 
costs. That is to be expected. Provision of nutri-
ent supplements and anti-parasitic medicines are 
very inexpensive and they can be delivered to chil-
dren very early in life where they can tnake a life-
time of difference. Insuring proper nutrition at the 
time when brain development is occurring, whether 
before birth by insuring maternal nutritional health, 
in infancy, or in pre-school can both shift up and 
out the marginal return to schooling in Figure 5.1. 
It would be very difficult to design an intervention 
in these poorest countries that would dominate the 
BCRs of these nutritional interventions. 
That said, the two studies that have explored the 
benefits of providing accurate information on the 
returns to schooling suggest that, for older children, 
a very inexpensive intervention with very large 
returns is just to provide children and their parents 
with accurate information on the value of school-
ing. Such an intervention could be easily built into 
the standard curriculum at low cost and has the 
potential of increasing academic effort while in 
school as well as increasing years of schooling. 
Finally we have the CCT programs that have 
been popular in Latin America. Most but not all 
have been cost-effective. They are most effective 
when targeted at child ages where dropout begins, 
and so transfer programs ai1ned at younger children 
tend to fail the benefit-cost criteria. 
These programs are most cost-effective when 
there is already a pre-existing CCT program aimed 
at helping the poor. These tend to be the more devel-
oped countries among the ones we have examined. 
In such circumstances, the marginal cost of taking 
an existing CCT program and adding conditions 
for its receipt is relatively low. It is unlikely that 
a country that has an insufficient upper class that 
could afford a CCT program or that does not have a 
pre-existing tax/transfer program would find such 
a program feasible on a national scale. 
To that end, Behrman et al. (2011) present esti-
mates of the benefits and costs of Mexico's PRO-
GRESA/Oportunidades program which I reproduce 
in Table 5.4. Including possible costs of distor-
tionary taxes and the opportunity cost of child time 
out of school as well as the costs of administer-
ing the program, the benefits of induced increased 
earnings easily outpace the costs of the progra1n. 
However, they do not also add in the costs of the 
transfer itself, arguing that the transfer comes at 
no real cost to the country. While I appreciate the 
public finance argument underlying this stance, I 
do not believe it applies as well when one is first 
implementing a CCT program where the opportu-
nity cost of scarce government funds may be very 
high. It is not obvious that if the transfer comes 
at the expense of government programs to provide 
secu1ity, rule of law, infrastructure, or other funda-
mental government services that the transfers come 
at zero cost to the country. In Mexico, where such 
transfers have been in place for many years, the 
opportunity cost of such funds can be more plausi-
bly argued to be negligible. 
Summary and recommendations 
Now that most children in developing countries 
enroll in school, economic development strategies 
have shifted to enhancing their learning while in 
school. This has led to a focus on improvements 
in school quality. While such improvements should 
increase lifetime returns to schooling in a com-
parable fashion to improvements in child health, 
investments in school quality have some important 
disadvantages to health interventions in a benefit-
cost sense. On the cost side, these interventions 
are typically more expensive per recipient than are 
nutrition supplements or preventive health. On the 
benefit side, the link between investment and result-
ing human capital acquisition is weaker than that 
between treatment and desired health outcomes. 
our knowledge of which inputs generate qual-
ity schooling outcomes is very weak, and addi-
tional investments in school inputs are unlikely 
to generate the desired learning response. There 
is widespread acknowledgement that resources are 
used inefficiently, but efforts to improve resource 
management by devolving authority to local juris-
dictions are as likely to fail as succeed. There is 
ample evidence of shirking by government teach-
ers but efforts to increa.;;e monitoring have been 
disappointing. Use of alternative teachers, whether 
contract teachers or tutors, are often successful, 
but their use begs the question of why they must 
be hired when civil service teachers appear to be 
underperforming. In addition, if these teachers will 
be converted into permanent government employ-
ees eventually, we must presume that the benefits 
of using contract teachers or tutors will be fleeting. 
Tying teacher bonus payments to student perfor-
mance on exams shows some promise, but there 
are too few studies to justify firm support for that 
option. Increasing years of schooling simply by 
providing accurate information on the returns to 
schooling is also quite promising and an inexpen-
sive intervention, but again there are too few studies 
upon which to base a world strategy. 
The most consistent evidence of success from 
schooling interventions in recent years comes fro1n 
transfer payments targeted to the poorest segments 
of society conditional on the children attending 
school. These programs have consistently increased 
child attendance, even when the transfer is of mod-
est size. Program administration costs have been 
lower than those of other social interventions. In 
addition to the positive schooling outcomes, these 
transfers have lowered the poverty rate, improved 
the nutritional status of poor households, and have 
increased the fraction of children receiving vacci-
nations and other health services. Even the most 
expensive and comprehensive of these progra1ns, 
the Mexican PROGRESA/Oportunidades program, 
have met the benefit-cost criteria. Because the pro-
grams increase the intensity of child investment in 
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school as well as increasing child time in school, 
they help to break the cycle of poverty whereby 
poor parents underinvest in their children's school-
ing and doom their children to poverty as well. 
And by increasing child attendance, we should see 
a concomitant increase in teacher attendance which 
will increase the quality of schooling offered to the 
poorest children in the country. 
Nevertheless, these programs can only succeed 
in relatively developed countries where the gov-
ernment institutions necessary to identify the poor-
est households, manage a large CCT program, and 
monitor child attendance are well developed. That 
would suggest the prospects for using CCTs would 
be best in countries in South or East Asia or in the 
more advanced countries of Africa. Caldes et al. 
(2006) report that the per child cost of three CCTs 
programs in Latin America ranged from $468 to 
$514 in 2012 dollars. At $468/child, using CCTs 
for the poorest decile of all the children in South 
Asia would cost $7 .8 billion, while targeting 10 per-
cent of the children in East Asia would cost $6. 7 
billion. As a particular example, the annual cost of 
a CCT program would be $320 million in Vietnam 
and $221 million in Thailand. 
In the poorer countries, programs aimed at 
improving the nutrient health of children are less 
expensive and can meet benefit-cost criteria despite 
the lower potential returns to human capital in such 
countries. Such programs can target very young 
children, taking advantage of potential increas-
ing returns from interventions that bump up the 
marginal benefit from schooling. One could address 
the needs of all 175 million malnourished children 
in the developing world under age 6 at a cost of 
roughly $5 billion per year using estimates pro-
vided by John Hoddinott et al. in their Challenge 
Paper (Chapter 6). 
All countries could benefit from improved 
information on the true returns from schooling. 
Although only two studies have buttressed that rec-
ommendation, the costs are very low and the poten-
tial benefits are quite promising. If one used the 
Madagascar estimates of 8 cents per chitd (Nguyen, 
2008), one could address all 670 million school-
aged children for $54 million, which is just implau-
sibly low. However, there is certainly a case for 
applying the strategy in more piloted cases with 
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rigorous evaluations so that we can get a better 
grasp of how best to transfer information on the 
benefits of schooling to children and their parents. 
The cost of a few more studies would be modest, 
and we would be ready to scale up four years from 
now once broader evidence is available. 
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